Natural Disaster Insurance for Sovereigns : Issues, Challenges and Optimality /

Natural disasters are a source of economic risks in many countries, especially in smaller and lower-income states, and ex-ante preparedness is needed to manage the risks. The paper discusses sovereign experience with disaster insurance as a key instrument to mitigate the risks; proposes ways to judg...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Cebotari, Aliona
Weitere Verfasser: Youssef, Karim
Format: Zeitschrift
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2020.
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2020/003
Online Zugang:Full text available on IMF
LEADER 02290cas a2200253 a 4500
001 AALejournalIMF016140
008 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d
020 |c 5.00 USD 
020 |z 9781513525891 
022 |a 1018-5941 
040 |a BD-DhAAL  |c BD-DhAAL 
100 1 |a Cebotari, Aliona. 
245 1 0 |a Natural Disaster Insurance for Sovereigns :   |b Issues, Challenges and Optimality /  |c Aliona Cebotari, Karim Youssef. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2020. 
300 |a 1 online resource (34 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a Natural disasters are a source of economic risks in many countries, especially in smaller and lower-income states, and ex-ante preparedness is needed to manage the risks. The paper discusses sovereign experience with disaster insurance as a key instrument to mitigate the risks; proposes ways to judge the adequacy of insurance; and considers ways to enhance its use by vulnerable countries. The paper especially aims to inform policy decisions on disaster insurance. Through simulations of natural disasters and various insurance options, we find that sovereign decisions on optimal risk transfer involve balancing trade-offs between growth and debt, based on government risk preferences and country risk exposure. The choice of optimal insurance for smaller countries turns out to be more constrained by cost considerations due to their higher exposure, likely resulting in underinsurance; donor grants could help them achieve a more optimal protection. We also find that optimal insurance packages are those that are least costly relative to expected payouts (i.e. have the lowest insurance multiple), which are also the packages that insure less severe (more frequent) disasters. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Youssef, Karim. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2020/003 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2020/003/001.2020.issue-003-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library