Innovate to Lead or Innovate to Prevail : When do Monopolistic Rents Induce Growth? /

This paper extends the Schumpeterian model of creative destruction by allowing followers' cost of innovation to increase in their technological distance from the leader. This assumption is motivated by the observation the more technologically ad- vanced the leader is, the harder it is for a fol...

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প্রধান লেখক: Piazza, Roberto
অন্যান্য লেখক: Zheng, Yu
বিন্যাস: পত্রিকা
ভাষা:English
প্রকাশিত: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2019.
মালা:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2019/294
অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন:Full text available on IMF
বিবরন
সংক্ষিপ্ত:This paper extends the Schumpeterian model of creative destruction by allowing followers' cost of innovation to increase in their technological distance from the leader. This assumption is motivated by the observation the more technologically ad- vanced the leader is, the harder it is for a follower to leapfrog without incurring extra cost for using leader's patented knowledge. Under this R and D cost structure, leaders innovate to increase their technological advantage so that followers will eventually stop innovating, allowing leadership to prevail. A new steady state then emerges featuring both leaders and followers innovating in few industries with low aggregate growth.
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দৈহিক বর্ননা:1 online resource (56 pages)
বিন্যাস:Mode of access: Internet
আইএসএসএন:1018-5941
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