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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781513584263
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Goodhart, C.
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|a Optimal Bank Recovery /
|c C. Goodhart, Miguel Segoviano.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2015.
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|a 1 online resource (41 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Banks' living wills involve both recovery and resolution. Since it may not always be clear when recovery plans or actions should be triggered, there is a role for an objective metric to trigger recovery. We outline how such a metric could be constructed meeting criteria of (i) adequate loss absorption; (ii) distinguishing between weak and sound banks; (iii) little susceptibility to manipulation; (iv) timeliness; (v) scalable from the individual bank to the system. We show how this would have worked in the U.K., during 2007-11. This approach has the added advantage that it could be extended to encompass a whole ladder of sanctions of increasing severity as capital erodes.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Segoviano, Miguel.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2015/217
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/217/001.2015.issue-217-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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