Delegated Portfolio Management, Benchmarking, and the Effects on Financial Markets /
We analyze the implications of linking the compensation of fund managers to the return of their portfolio relative to that of a benchmark-a common solution to the agency problem in delegated portfolio management. In the presence of such relativeperformance- based objectives, investors have reduced e...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Outros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Periódico |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado em: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2015.
|
| Colecção: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2015/198 |
| Acesso em linha: | Full text available on IMF |
| Resumo: | We analyze the implications of linking the compensation of fund managers to the return of their portfolio relative to that of a benchmark-a common solution to the agency problem in delegated portfolio management. In the presence of such relativeperformance- based objectives, investors have reduced expected utility but markets are typically more informative and deeper. Furthermore, in a multiple asset/market framework we show that (i) relative performance concerns lead to an increase in the correlation between markets (financial contagion); (ii) benchmark inclusion increases price volatility; (iii) home bias emerges as a rational outcome. When information is costly, information acquisition is hindered and this attenuates the effects on informativeness and depth of the market. |
|---|---|
| Descrição do item: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descrição Física: | 1 online resource (39 pages) |
| Formato: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Acesso: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |