Default Premium /

We re-assess the view that sovereigns with a history of default are charged only a small and/or short-lived premium on the interest rate warranted by observed fundamentals. Our reassessment uses a metric of such a 'default premium' (DP) that is consistent with asymmetric information models...

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Bibliografske podrobnosti
Glavni avtor: Catao, Luis
Drugi avtorji: Mano, Rui
Format: Revija
Jezik:English
Izdano: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2015.
Serija:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2015/167
Online dostop:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Default Premium /  |c Luis Catao, Rui Mano. 
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300 |a 1 online resource (57 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
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500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a We re-assess the view that sovereigns with a history of default are charged only a small and/or short-lived premium on the interest rate warranted by observed fundamentals. Our reassessment uses a metric of such a 'default premium' (DP) that is consistent with asymmetric information models and nests previous metrics, and applies it to a much broader dataset relative to earlier studies. We find a sizeable and persistent DP: in 1870-1938, it averaged 250 bps upon market re-entry, tapering to around 150 bps five years out; in 1970- 2011 the respective estimates are about 400 and 200 bps. We also find that: (i) these estimates are robust to many controls including on actual haircuts; (ii) the DP accounts for as much as 60% of the sovereign spread within five years of market re-entry; (iii) the DP rises with market exclusion spells. These findings help reconnect theory and evidence on why sovereign defaults are infrequent and earlier debt settlements are desirable. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Mano, Rui. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2015/167 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/167/001.2015.issue-167-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library