From Systemic Banking Crises to Fiscal Costs : Risk Factors /

This paper examines the risk factors associated with fiscal costs of systemic banking crises using cross-country data. We differentiate between immediate direct fiscal costs of government intervention (e.g., recapitalization and asset purchases) and overall fiscal costs of banking crises as proxied...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Amaglobeli, David
Autres auteurs: End, Nicolas, Jarmuzek, Mariusz, Palomba, Geremia
Format: Revue
Langue:English
Publié: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2015.
Collection:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2015/166
Accès en ligne:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Amaglobeli, David. 
245 1 0 |a From Systemic Banking Crises to Fiscal Costs :   |b Risk Factors /  |c David Amaglobeli, Nicolas End, Mariusz Jarmuzek, Geremia Palomba. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2015. 
300 |a 1 online resource (43 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper examines the risk factors associated with fiscal costs of systemic banking crises using cross-country data. We differentiate between immediate direct fiscal costs of government intervention (e.g., recapitalization and asset purchases) and overall fiscal costs of banking crises as proxied by changes in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We find that both direct and overall fiscal costs of banking crises are high when countries enter the crisis with large banking sectors that rely on external funding, have leveraged non-financial private sectors, and use guarantees on bank liabilities during the crisis. The better quality of banking supervision and the higher coverage of deposit insurance help, however, alleviate the direct fiscal costs. We also identify a possible policy trade-off: costly short-term interventions are not necessarily associated with larger increases in public debt, supporting the thesis that immediate intervention may be actually cost-effective over time. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a End, Nicolas. 
700 1 |a Jarmuzek, Mariusz. 
700 1 |a Palomba, Geremia. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2015/166 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/166/001.2015.issue-166-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library