Does Easing Monetary Policy Increase Financial Instability? /

This paper develops a model featuring both a macroeconomic and a financial friction that speaks to the interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policies. There are two main results. First, real interest rate rigidities in a monopolistic banking system have an asymmetric impact on financial...

ver descrição completa

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Cesa-Bianchi, Ambrogio
Outros Autores: Rebucci, Alessandro
Formato: Periódico
Idioma:English
Publicado em: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2015.
Colecção:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2015/139
Acesso em linha:Full text available on IMF
LEADER 02247cas a2200253 a 4500
001 AALejournalIMF015321
008 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d
020 |c 5.00 USD 
020 |z 9781513588490 
022 |a 1018-5941 
040 |a BD-DhAAL  |c BD-DhAAL 
100 1 |a Cesa-Bianchi, Ambrogio. 
245 1 0 |a Does Easing Monetary Policy Increase Financial Instability? /  |c Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Alessandro Rebucci. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2015. 
300 |a 1 online resource (47 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper develops a model featuring both a macroeconomic and a financial friction that speaks to the interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policies. There are two main results. First, real interest rate rigidities in a monopolistic banking system have an asymmetric impact on financial stability: they increase the probability of a financial crisis (relative to the case of flexible interest rate) in response to contractionary shocks to the economy, while they act as automatic macro-prudential stabilizers in response to expansionary shocks. Second, when the interest rate is the only available policy instrument, a monetary authority subject to the same constraints as private agents cannot always achieve a (constrained) efficient allocation and faces a trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability in response to contractionary shocks. An implication of our analysis is that the weak link in the U.S. policy framework in the run up to the Global Recession was not excessively lax monetary policy after 2002, but rather the absence of an effective regulatory framework aimed at preserving financial stability. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Rebucci, Alessandro. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2015/139 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/139/001.2015.issue-139-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library