Energy Subsidies and Public Social Spending : Theory and Evidence /
This paper shows that high energy subsidies and low public social spending can emerge as an equilibrium outcome of a political game between the elite and the middle-class when the provision of public goods is subject to bottlenecks, reflecting weak domestic institutions. We test this and other predi...
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| অন্যান্য লেখক: | |
| বিন্যাস: | পত্রিকা |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2015.
|
| মালা: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2015/101 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Full text available on IMF |