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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781484308691
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|a 1018-5941
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|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Papi, Luca.
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|a IMF Lending and Banking Crises /
|c Luca Papi, Andrea Presbitero, Alberto Zazzaro.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2015.
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|a 1 online resource (56 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper looks at the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs on banking crises in a large sample of developing countries, over the period 1970-2010. The endogeneity of the IMF intervention is addressed by adopting an instrumental variable strategy and a propensity score matching estimator. Controlling for the standard determinants of banking crises, our results indicate that countries participating in IMF-supported lending programs are significantly less likely to experience a future banking crisis than nonborrowing countries. We also provide evidence suggesting that compliance with conditionality and loan size matter.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Presbitero, Andrea.
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|a Zazzaro, Alberto.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2015/019
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/019/001.2015.issue-019-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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