Non-Defaultable Debt and Sovereign Risk /

We quantify gains from introducing non-defaultable debt as a limited additional financing option into a model of equilibrium sovereign risk. We find that, for an initial (defaultable) sovereign debt level equal to 66 percent of trend aggregate income and a sovereign spread of 2.9 percent, introducin...

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Autore principale: Hatchondo, Juan Carlos
Altri autori: Kursat Onder, Yasin, Martinez, Leonardo
Natura: Periodico
Lingua:English
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2014.
Serie:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2014/198
Accesso online:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Non-Defaultable Debt and Sovereign Risk /  |c Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, Yasin Kursat Onder. 
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490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
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520 3 |a We quantify gains from introducing non-defaultable debt as a limited additional financing option into a model of equilibrium sovereign risk. We find that, for an initial (defaultable) sovereign debt level equal to 66 percent of trend aggregate income and a sovereign spread of 2.9 percent, introducing the possibility of issuing non-defaultable debt for up to 10 percent of aggregate income reduces immediately the spread to 1.4 percent, and implies a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of 0.9 percent. The spread reduction would be only 0.1 (0.2) percentage points higher if the government uses nondefaultable debt to buy back (finance a 'voluntary' debt exchange for) previously issued defaultable debt. Without restrictions to defaultable debt issuances in the future, the spread reduction achieved by the introduction of non-defaultable debt is short lived. We also show that allowing governments in default to increase non-defaultable debt is damaging at the time non-defaultable debt is introduced and inconsequential in the medium term. These findings shed light on different aspects of proposals to introduce common euro-area sovereign bonds that could be virtually non-defaultable. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Kursat Onder, Yasin. 
700 1 |a Martinez, Leonardo. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2014/198 
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