Deposit Insurance Database /

Deposit Insurance Database /

This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent gl...

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Detaylı Bibliyografya
Yazar: Demirguc-Kunt, Asli
Diğer Yazarlar: Kane, Edward, Laeven, Luc
Materyal Türü: Dergi
Dil:English
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2014.
Seri Bilgileri:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2014/118
Online Erişim:Full text available on IMF
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020 |z 9781498354479 
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100 1 |a Demirguc-Kunt, Asli. 
245 1 0 |a Deposit Insurance Database /  |c Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Edward Kane, Luc Laeven. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2014. 
300 |a 1 online resource (44 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Kane, Edward. 
700 1 |a Laeven, Luc. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2014/118 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2014/118/001.2014.issue-118-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library 

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