Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision /
We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there i...
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | |
| التنسيق: | دورية |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2014.
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| سلاسل: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2014/090 |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Full text available on IMF |