Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts : Who Pays the Premium? /
Studies have shown that markets may underprice sub-national governments' risk on the implicit assumption that these entities would be bailed out by their central government in case of financial difficulties. However, the question of whether sovereigns pay a premium on their own borrowing as a r...
| Main Author: | Jenkner, Eva |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Lu, Zhongjin |
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2014.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2014/020 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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