Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times : Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out /

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and low spreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising their deficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and, surprisingly, so...

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Chi tiết về thư mục
Tác giả chính: Broner, Fernando
Tác giả khác: Erce, Aitor, Martin, Alberto, Ventura, Jaume
Định dạng: Tạp chí
Ngôn ngữ:English
Được phát hành: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2013.
Loạt:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2013/270
Truy cập trực tuyến:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Broner, Fernando. 
245 1 0 |a Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times :   |b Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out /  |c Fernando Broner, Aitor Erce, Alberto Martin, Jaume Ventura. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2013. 
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490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
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520 3 |a In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and low spreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising their deficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and, surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocated from the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions even further. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debt can be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereign debt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This provides incentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowing is limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productive investment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead to self-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countries in the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Erce, Aitor. 
700 1 |a Martin, Alberto. 
700 1 |a Ventura, Jaume. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2013/270 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2013/270/001.2013.issue-270-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library