Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance /
Depositor preference and collateralization of borrowing may reduce the cost of settling the conflicts among creditors that arises in case of resolution or bankruptcy. This net benefit, which may be capitalized into the value of the bank rather than affect creditors' expected returns, should res...
| Autor principal: | Hardy, Daniel |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Periódico |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado em: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2013.
|
| Colecção: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2013/172 |
| Acesso em linha: | Full text available on IMF |
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