Rethinking Macro Policy II : Getting Granular /

This note explores how the economic thinking about macroeconomic management has evolved since the crisis began. It discusses developments in monetary policy, including unconventional measures; the challenges associated with increased public debt; and the policy potential, risks, and institutional ch...

وصف كامل

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلف الرئيسي: Blanchard, Olivier
مؤلفون آخرون: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, Mauro, Paolo
التنسيق: دورية
اللغة:English
منشور في: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2013.
سلاسل:Staff Discussion Notes; Staff Discussion Notes ; No. 2013/003
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Rethinking Macro Policy II :   |b Getting Granular /  |c Olivier Blanchard, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Paolo Mauro. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2013. 
300 |a 1 online resource (26 pages) 
490 1 |a Staff Discussion Notes 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This note explores how the economic thinking about macroeconomic management has evolved since the crisis began. It discusses developments in monetary policy, including unconventional measures; the challenges associated with increased public debt; and the policy potential, risks, and institutional challenges associated with new macroprudential measures. Rationale: The note contributes to the ongoing debate on several aspects of macroeconomic policy. It follows up on the earlier 'Rethinking' paper, refining the analysis in light of the events of the past two years. Given the relatively fluid state of the debate (e.g., recent challenges to central bank independence), it is useful to highlight that while many of the tenets of the pre-crisis consensus have been challenged, others (such as the desirability of central bank independence) remain valid. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni. 
700 1 |a Mauro, Paolo. 
830 0 |a Staff Discussion Notes; Staff Discussion Notes ;  |v No. 2013/003 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/006/2013/003/006.2013.issue-003-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library