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|z 9781589062160
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|a 0251-6365
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|a Daban Sanchez, Teresa.
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|a Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain /
|c Teresa Daban Sanchez, Steven Symansky, Gian Milesi-Ferretti, Enrica Detragiache.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2003.
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|a 1 online resource (46 pages)
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|a Occasional Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Detragiache, Enrica.
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|a Milesi-Ferretti, Gian.
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|a Symansky, Steven.
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|a Occasional Papers; Occasional Paper ;
|v No. 2003/009
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/books/084/06029-9781589062160-en/06029-9781589062160-en-book.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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