Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain /
Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should...
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| Altri autori: | , , |
| Natura: | Periodico |
| Lingua: | English |
| Pubblicazione: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2003.
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| Serie: | Occasional Papers; Occasional Paper ;
No. 2003/009 |
| Accesso online: | Full text available on IMF |
| Riassunto: | Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies. |
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| Descrizione del documento: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (46 pages) |
| Natura: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 0251-6365 |
| Accesso: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |