Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? /
Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF's role should be.
| 1. autor: | Phillips, Steven |
|---|---|
| Kolejni autorzy: | Lane, Timothy |
| Format: | Czasopismo |
| Język: | English |
| Wydane: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2003.
|
| Seria: | Economic Issues; Economic Issues ;
No. 2002/003 |
| Dostęp online: | Full text available on IMF |
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