Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? /
Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF's role should be.
Yazar: | Phillips, Steven |
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Diğer Yazarlar: | Lane, Timothy |
Materyal Türü: | Dergi |
Dil: | English |
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2003.
|
Seri Bilgileri: | Economic Issues; Economic Issues ;
No. 2002/003 |
Online Erişim: | Full text available on IMF |
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