Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? /

Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF's role should be.

Dades bibliogràfiques
Autor principal: Phillips, Steven
Altres autors: Lane, Timothy
Format: Revista
Idioma:English
Publicat: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Col·lecció:Economic Issues; Economic Issues ; No. 2002/003
Accés en línia:Full text available on IMF
Descripció
Sumari:Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF's role should be.
Descripció de l’ítem:<strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
<strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
Descripció física:1 online resource (20 pages)
Format:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1020-5098
Accés:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students