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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781475510560
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Singh, Manmohan.
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|a Puts in the Shadow /
|c Manmohan Singh.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2012.
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|a 1 online resource (21 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a In the aftermath of the Lehman crisis, payouts (i.e., taxpayer bailouts) in various forms were provided by governments to a variety of financial institutions and markets that were outside the regulatory perimeter - the a"shadow" banking system. Although recent regulatory proposals attempt to reduce these a"puts", we provide examples from non-banking activities within a bank, money market funds, Triparty repo, OTC derivatives market, collateral with central banks, and issuance of floating rate notes et cetera, that these risks remain. We suggest that a regulatory environment where puts are not ambiguous will likely lower the cost of bail-outs after a crisis.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2012/229
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2012/229/001.2012.issue-229-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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