Puts in the Shadow /
In the aftermath of the Lehman crisis, payouts (i.e., taxpayer bailouts) in various forms were provided by governments to a variety of financial institutions and markets that were outside the regulatory perimeter - the a"shadow" banking system. Although recent regulatory proposals attempt...
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| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2012.
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| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2012/229 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
| Summary: | In the aftermath of the Lehman crisis, payouts (i.e., taxpayer bailouts) in various forms were provided by governments to a variety of financial institutions and markets that were outside the regulatory perimeter - the a"shadow" banking system. Although recent regulatory proposals attempt to reduce these a"puts", we provide examples from non-banking activities within a bank, money market funds, Triparty repo, OTC derivatives market, collateral with central banks, and issuance of floating rate notes et cetera, that these risks remain. We suggest that a regulatory environment where puts are not ambiguous will likely lower the cost of bail-outs after a crisis. |
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| Item Description: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (21 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Access: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |