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|z 9781475505443
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|a 1018-5941
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|a Townsend, Robert.
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|a Barriers to Household Risk Management :
|b Evidence from India /
|c Robert Townsend, Shawn Cole, Jeremy Tobacman, Xavier Gine.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2012.
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|a 1 online resource (43 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of non-systematic income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and non-price factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. Demand is significantly price sensitive, but widespread take-up would not be achieved even if the product offered a payout ratio comparable to U.S. insurance contracts. We present evidence suggesting that lack of trust, liquidity constraints and limited salience are significant non-price frictions that constrain demand. We suggest contract design improvements to mitigate these frictions.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Cole, Shawn.
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|a Gine, Xavier.
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|a Tobacman, Jeremy.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2012/195
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2012/195/001.2012.issue-195-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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