Bank Capitalization As a Signal /
The level of a bank's capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping ca...
| Autor principal: | Hardy, Daniel |
|---|---|
| Format: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicat: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2012.
|
| Col·lecció: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2012/114 |
| Accés en línia: | Full text available on IMF |
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