Bank Capitalization As a Signal /
The level of a bank's capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping ca...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Format: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicat: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2012.
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| Col·lecció: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2012/114 |
| Accés en línia: | Full text available on IMF |
| Sumari: | The level of a bank's capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping capitalization low, and banks' creditors often cannot distinguish among them - tendencies that can be seen across banks and across time. Prudential policy is warranted to help offset these tendencies. |
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| Descripció de l’ítem: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descripció física: | 1 online resource (25 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Accés: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |