Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation /

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially op...

Täydet tiedot

Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijä: Valencia, Fabian
Muut tekijät: Ueda, Kenichi
Aineistotyyppi: Aikakauslehti
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2012.
Sarja:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2012/101
Linkit:Full text available on IMF

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