Bank Competition and Financial Stability : A General Equilibrium Exposition /
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relativel...
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| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2011.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2011/295 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |