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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781463924560
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Quintyn, Marc.
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|a The Economic Crisis :
|b Did Financial Supervision Matter? /
|c Marc Quintyn, Rosaria Vega Pansini, Donato Masciandaro.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2011.
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|a 1 online resource (47 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of worldwide efforts to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision. However, the crisis that started in 2007?08 was a crude awakening: several of these improvements seemed unable to avoid or mitigate the crisis. This paper brings the first systematic analysis of the role of two of these efforts - modifications in the architecture of financial supervision and in supervisory governance - and concludes that they were negatively correlated with economic resilience. Using the emerging distinction between macro- and micro-prudential supervision, we explore to what extent two separate institutions would allow for more checks and balances to improve supervisory governance and, thus, reduce the probability of supervisory failure.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Masciandaro, Donato.
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|a Vega Pansini, Rosaria.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2011/261
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2011/261/001.2011.issue-261-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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