The Economic Crisis : Did Financial Supervision Matter? /

The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of worldwide efforts to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision. However, the crisis that started in 2007?08 was a crude awakening: several of these improvements seemed unable to avoid or mitigate the crisis. This paper brings the first syst...

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Bibliografske podrobnosti
Glavni avtor: Quintyn, Marc
Drugi avtorji: Masciandaro, Donato, Vega Pansini, Rosaria
Format: Revija
Jezik:English
Izdano: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2011.
Serija:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2011/261
Online dostop:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 4 |a The Economic Crisis :   |b Did Financial Supervision Matter? /  |c Marc Quintyn, Rosaria Vega Pansini, Donato Masciandaro. 
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520 3 |a The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of worldwide efforts to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision. However, the crisis that started in 2007?08 was a crude awakening: several of these improvements seemed unable to avoid or mitigate the crisis. This paper brings the first systematic analysis of the role of two of these efforts - modifications in the architecture of financial supervision and in supervisory governance - and concludes that they were negatively correlated with economic resilience. Using the emerging distinction between macro- and micro-prudential supervision, we explore to what extent two separate institutions would allow for more checks and balances to improve supervisory governance and, thus, reduce the probability of supervisory failure. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Masciandaro, Donato. 
700 1 |a Vega Pansini, Rosaria. 
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