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|z 9781462313327
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Debrun, Xavier.
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|a Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies /
|c Xavier Debrun.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2011.
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource (15 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on "fiscal councils" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing "commitment technologies" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2011/173
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2011/173/001.2011.issue-173-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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