Alternatives to the Central Bank in the Developing World /

This paper discusses the operations of a wide range of central banking institutions in developing countries. The considerable diversity of economic, financial, and political conditions within the Third World has brought forth a wide variety of central banking institutions. Four polar types have been...

Täydet tiedot

Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijä: Collyns, Charles
Aineistotyyppi: Aikakauslehti
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1983.
Sarja:Occasional Papers; Occasional Paper ; No. 1983/001
Linkit:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Collyns, Charles. 
245 1 0 |a Alternatives to the Central Bank in the Developing World /  |c Charles Collyns. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 1983. 
300 |a 1 online resource (28 pages) 
490 1 |a Occasional Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper discusses the operations of a wide range of central banking institutions in developing countries. The considerable diversity of economic, financial, and political conditions within the Third World has brought forth a wide variety of central banking institutions. Four polar types have been identified as providing coherent alternatives to the central bank. Historical experience certainly indicates that legislation on its own may not be enough to guarantee prudent behavior. Although many countries' central banking institutions have not yet come close to violating foreign exchange cover requirements or restrictions on government lending, in other cases the rules have simply been sidestepped by technical adjustments, altered expediently, or merely ignored. The organizational structure established by legislation probably plays a more positive part in determining a central banking institution's characteristic behavior. Operating procedures, channels of communication, and lines of command all exert some influence on where and how decisions are made in practice. The balance of power between government and monetary authority does not only depend on personality and outside support but will also be influenced by the institutional framework in which their interaction is established. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
830 0 |a Occasional Papers; Occasional Paper ;  |v No. 1983/001 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/books/084/00251-9781557750570-en/00251-9781557750570-en-book.xml  |z IMF e-Library