IMF Staff papers : Volume 42 No. 1.
This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last...
| 団体著者: | |
|---|---|
| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1995.
|
| シリーズ: | IMF Staff Papers; IMF Staff Papers ;
No. 1995/001 |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |
| 要約: | This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last twenty years rather than sooner? We begin by discussing the 'tax smoothing' model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions. We then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize into six groups: (1) models based upon opportunistic policy makers and naive voters with 'fiscal illusion'; (2) models of intergenerational redistributions; (3) models of debt as a strategic variable, linking the current government with the next one; (4) models of coalition governments; (5) models of geographically dispersed interests; and (6) models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions. We conclude by briefly discussing policy implications. |
|---|---|
| 記述事項: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| 物理的記述: | 1 online resource (244 pages) |
| フォーマット: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1020-7635 |
| アクセス: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |