Externalities. Incentives, and Economic Reforms.
The paper emphasizes the role of institutions and incentives in the presence of externalities. An economy with multiple public decision makers is likely to experience 'overspending,' 'undertaxing,' 'overborrowing,' and 'overinflation' unless effective institut...
| সংস্থা লেখক: | |
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| বিন্যাস: | পত্রিকা |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1990.
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| মালা: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1990/010 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Full text available on IMF |
| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | The paper emphasizes the role of institutions and incentives in the presence of externalities. An economy with multiple public decision makers is likely to experience 'overspending,' 'undertaxing,' 'overborrowing,' and 'overinflation' unless effective institutions exist for overcoming coordination failure. External financing may weaken incentives for adjustment over the longer run unless assistance is made conditional on fundamental institutional reforms. The paper also analyzes reforms that strengthen incentives to provide effort. Uncertainty regarding future taxes reduces present effort and the responsiveness of output to market signals. In addition, the paper addresses the adverse effects of bank insurance and soft budget constraints. |
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| উপাদানের বিবরণ: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| দৈহিক বর্ননা: | 1 online resource (40 pages) |
| বিন্যাস: | Mode of access: Internet |
| আইএসএসএন: | 1018-5941 |
| প্রবেশাধিকার: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |