Policy Inconsistency and External Debt Service.
In this paper it is argued that the willingness of debtors to make external debt-service payments reflects, in part, their inability to credibly and permanently suspend debt service. The benefits of a credible debt-service suspension would include increased private investment. But this would, in tur...
| Tác giả của công ty: | |
|---|---|
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1990.
|
| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1990/035 |
| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |