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01723cas a2200241 a 4500 |
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AALejournalIMF010068 |
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230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d |
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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451965636
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a International Monetary Fund.
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|a Optimal Tax/Expenditure Competition Strategy of Governments in the Presence of Time Inconsistency :
|b The Case for Investment Tax Abacemencs.
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| 264 |
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 1990.
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource (20 pages)
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 500 |
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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| 500 |
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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| 506 |
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Businesses which seek the location that offers the highest profitability are likely to consider tax incentives and the level of government services available. However, once a business commits itself to a locality, high moving costs render it vulnerable to future tax increases or denial of government services. Fear of time inconsistency will lower expected business profitability in a region. This paper indicates that a developing country or locality can attract a higher level of capital with a tax abatement scheme which provides a subsidy (funded by a capital income tax) equivalent to moving/setup costs.
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| 538 |
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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| 830 |
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 1990/059
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1990/059/001.1990.issue-059-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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