This paper considers a number of reasons-in addition to the 'incentives' argument-why debt relief could be to the advantage of creditors collectively. Principal reasons analyzed are based on the 'investment-capacity' and the 'default-forestalling' arguments. Debt relief...
|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 1988.
300
|a 1 online resource (22 pages)
490
1
|a IMF Working Papers
500
|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
500
|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
506
|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
520
3
|a This paper considers a number of reasons-in addition to the 'incentives' argument-why debt relief could be to the advantage of creditors collectively. Principal reasons analyzed are based on the 'investment-capacity' and the 'default-forestalling' arguments. Debt relief is defined as reduction of the present value of the contractual debt. The paper thus provides an analytical basis for various debt relief proposals that do not require finance or guarantees from creditor governments and for the considerable amount of relief in the form of rescheduling and concerted lending that has already taken place. The free rider problem and the extent to which the market may overcome it is discussed.
538
|a Mode of access: Internet
830
0
|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 1988/072
856
4
0
|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1988/072/001.1988.issue-072-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library