Voluntary Debt Reduction : Incentives and Welfare.

In an economy with a debt overhang, investment depends on expected tax rates. On the other hand, expected tax rates depend on the debt's face value. Therefore investment depends on the face value of debt. I show that this may lead to a positive or negative association between debt and investmen...

Fuld beskrivelse

Bibliografiske detaljer
Institution som forfatter: International Monetary Fund
Format: Tidsskrift
Sprog:English
Udgivet: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1988.
Serier:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1988/084
Online adgang:Full text available on IMF
Beskrivelse
Summary:In an economy with a debt overhang, investment depends on expected tax rates. On the other hand, expected tax rates depend on the debt's face value. Therefore investment depends on the face value of debt. I show that this may lead to a positive or negative association between debt and investment depending on the degree of international capital mobility and attitudes toward risk. There may also exist multiple equilibria; with high and low investment levels. The paper explores the desirability of debt reduction in this environment. First, it characterizes circumstances in which debt reduction is desirable from the collective point of view of the creditors. Second, it formulates the forgiveness decision as a noncooperative game among creditors and explores the scope for debt reduction as an outcome of this game.
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Fysisk beskrivelse:1 online resource (50 pages)
Format:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
Adgang:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students