Optimal Fiscal Policy and Government Provision of Contingent Liabilities : The Example of Government Loan and Deposit Guarantees.

The optimal provision of loan guarantees or deposit insurance is examined in the context of an overlapping generations model. It is demonstrated that even in the face of a market imperfection that precludes diversification of the private sector's loan portfolio to eliminate risk, full governmen...

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التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
مؤلف مشترك: International Monetary Fund
التنسيق: دورية
اللغة:English
منشور في: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1989.
سلاسل:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1989/084
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Optimal Fiscal Policy and Government Provision of Contingent Liabilities :   |b The Example of Government Loan and Deposit Guarantees. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 1989. 
300 |a 1 online resource (28 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a The optimal provision of loan guarantees or deposit insurance is examined in the context of an overlapping generations model. It is demonstrated that even in the face of a market imperfection that precludes diversification of the private sector's loan portfolio to eliminate risk, full government guarantee of private sector loans (or deposits) is suboptimal. The results of the paper suggest that although some degree of guarantee is appropriate, the design of such policies should be tempered to avoid an inefficient level of capital accumulation. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 1989/084 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1989/084/001.1989.issue-084-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library