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AALejournalIMF009960 |
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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451948004
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a International Monetary Fund.
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|a Debt Relief and Leveraged Buy-Outs.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 1988.
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|a 1 online resource (6 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 500 |
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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| 500 |
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Analyses of debt relief that focus on the behavior of debtors and existing creditors understate the incentives for collective action by creditors. It is well known that debt relief could benefit existing creditors by providing incentives for domestic investment by residents of debtor countries. It is argued here that relief could also make available additional profit opportunities to international investors. Under these circumstances, arrangements that would allow international investors to capture economic profits would make a leveraged buy-out of existing creditors, followed by relief, a profitable strategy for any investor or group of investors that could act collectively.
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| 538 |
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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| 650 |
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|a Buy-Out Specialist
|2 imf
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| 650 |
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|a Buy-Out
|2 imf
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| 650 |
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|a Debtor Country
|2 imf
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| 650 |
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|a Leveraged Buy-Out
|2 imf
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| 650 |
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|a WP
|2 imf
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| 830 |
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 1988/103
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1988/103/001.1988.issue-103-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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