Debt Relief and Leveraged Buy-Outs.
Analyses of debt relief that focus on the behavior of debtors and existing creditors understate the incentives for collective action by creditors. It is well known that debt relief could benefit existing creditors by providing incentives for domestic investment by residents of debtor countries. It i...
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| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1988.
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| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1988/103 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
| Summary: | Analyses of debt relief that focus on the behavior of debtors and existing creditors understate the incentives for collective action by creditors. It is well known that debt relief could benefit existing creditors by providing incentives for domestic investment by residents of debtor countries. It is argued here that relief could also make available additional profit opportunities to international investors. Under these circumstances, arrangements that would allow international investors to capture economic profits would make a leveraged buy-out of existing creditors, followed by relief, a profitable strategy for any investor or group of investors that could act collectively. |
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| Item Description: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (6 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Access: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |