Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? : Supervisory Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View /

The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship....

詳細記述

書誌詳細
第一著者: Quintyn, Marc
その他の著者: Masciandaro, Donato
フォーマット: 雑誌
言語:English
出版事項: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
シリーズ:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/047
オンライン・アクセス:Full text available on IMF
その他の書誌記述
要約:The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a consolidated supervisory regime and reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and the market operators.
記述事項:<strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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物理的記述:1 online resource (46 pages)
フォーマット:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
アクセス:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students