Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt : The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime /
In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively di...
|a Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt :
|b The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime /
|c Patrick Bolton, Olivier Jeanne.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2007.
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|a 1 online resource (27 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Jeanne, Olivier.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2007/192
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2007/192/001.2007.issue-192-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library