On the Buyability of Voting Bodies /
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups...
| Tác giả chính: | |
|---|---|
| Tác giả khác: | |
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2007.
|
| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2007/165 |
| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |