On the Buyability of Voting Bodies /
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups...
मुख्य लेखक: | |
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अन्य लेखक: | |
स्वरूप: | पत्रिका |
भाषा: | English |
प्रकाशित: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2007.
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श्रृंखला: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2007/165 |
विषय: | |
ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | Full text available on IMF |