On the Buyability of Voting Bodies /

We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Vardy, Felix
Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Morgan, John
Μορφή: Επιστημονικό περιοδικό
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2007.
Σειρά:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2007/165
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full text available on IMF