On the Buyability of Voting Bodies /
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups...
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| অন্যান্য লেখক: | |
| বিন্যাস: | পত্রিকা |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2007.
|
| মালা: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2007/165 |
| বিষয়গুলি: | |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Full text available on IMF |