The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions : Theory and Empirical Evidence /
This paper discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline. A dynamic model of fiscal policy shows that optimal institutions lack credibility unless the costs to bypass them are sufficiently high. In our model, a combination...
| 第一著者: | Debrun, Xavier |
|---|---|
| その他の著者: | Kumar, Manmohan |
| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2007.
|
| シリーズ: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2007/171 |
| オンライン・アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |
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