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|z 9781451867046
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
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|a Laeven, Luc.
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|a Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations /
|c Luc Laeven, Ross Levine.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2007.
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|a 1 online resource (37 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Levine, Ross.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2007/140
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2007/140/001.2007.issue-140-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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