Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard /
This paper develops a simple model of international lending, and calibrates it to assess quantitatively the effects of contingent IMF financial support on the risk premiums and the crisis probability. In the model, the country borrows in both short and long term; market (coordination) failure trigge...
Հիմնական հեղինակ: | Kim, Jun |
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Ձևաչափ: | Ամսագիր |
Լեզու: | English |
Հրապարակվել է: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2007.
|
Շարք: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2007/104 |
Առցանց հասանելիություն: | Full text available on IMF |
Նմանատիպ նյութեր
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Fund Financial Support and Moral Hazard : Analytics and Empirics.
Հրապարակվել է: (2007) -
Unconditional Equality
: Skaria -
Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard? /
: Phillips, Steven
Հրապարակվել է: (2000) -
Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? /
: Phillips, Steven
Հրապարակվել է: (2002) -
Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? /
: Phillips, Steven
Հրապարակվել է: (2003)