Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard /
This paper develops a simple model of international lending, and calibrates it to assess quantitatively the effects of contingent IMF financial support on the risk premiums and the crisis probability. In the model, the country borrows in both short and long term; market (coordination) failure trigge...
| Main Author: | Kim, Jun |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2007.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2007/104 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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