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|z 9781451863246
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Messmacher, Miguel.
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|a Sovereign Insurance and Program Design :
|b What is Optimal for the Sovereign? /
|c Miguel Messmacher.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2006.
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|a 1 online resource (30 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; ii) the premium increases with the sovereign's incentive to take risks; iii) a deductible is chosen to limit moral hazard; iv) the deductible-to-support ratio is decreasing with the size of the realized shock; and v) the change in the choice of savings when insurance is available is ambiguous, as there is a trade-off between inducing higher effort and increasing the likelihood of default.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2006/064
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/064/001.2006.issue-064-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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